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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
ARTICLE 52 -ENFORCEMENT

OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5201: Reservation clause in liability policy causes new Seider
problems.
The rule of Seider v. Roth110 allows a New York plaintiff to maintain a quasi-in-Tern action by attaching the contractual obligations of a
liability insurer to defend and indemnify a nonresident insured defendant. The value of the attached res is the limit of the liability policy 1 and the insurer, who is the true party in interest, is liable up to
this amount in the event the insured defendant is held responsible for
the plaintiff's injuries. Since a plaintiff only resorts to this peculiar
procedure when no other basis of jurisdiction over the defendant is
available, the typical Seider case involves an out-of-state accident and a
defendant whose only contact with New York is the amenability of his
insurer to process here. Despite the extremely tenuous nexus with the
forum state in such cases, Seider has thus far withstood constitutional
12
attack."
A new problem spawned by the Seider doctrine arose in Seligman
v. Tucker,1 3 wherein a New York resident plaintiff commenced- a personal injury action arising out of a Massachusetts accident by attaching
the Washington, D.C. resident defendant's automobile liability policy.
The policy contained the following provision:
The Company shall have no obligation to indemnify, pay to or on
behalf of, or defend any person entitled to protection under this
policy where such obligations or this policy provide the sole basis
110 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 212, 269 N.Y.S2d 99 (1966), noted in 67 CoLum L. REV.
550 (1969); 51 MmN L. R v. 158 (1966); 43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 58 (1968).
111 See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 205, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.YS.2d 633 (1968).
112 In its first contitutional test in the federal courts, the Seider doctrine was held
unconstitutional, the court proceeding on the assumption that New York law did not allow a limited appearance. The court reasoned that unless the defendant was permitted to
defend on the merits without conferring in personam jurisdiction, he would be denied
due process of law. Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Indeed at the
time Seider and Podolsky were decided, CPLR 320(c)(1) had not yet been enacted and no
other New York authority for a limited appearance existed. Subsequently, however, in
Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 205, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1968), the New
York Court of Appeals held that the defendant in a Seider-type action could appear and
defend on the merits without suffering any in personam consequences. This holding rescued Seider from oblivion. In Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd
en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 844, rehearing denied, 396 U.S. 949
(1969), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the Seider procedure as supplemented by the limited appearance created in Simpson. In so holding, the
court assumed that if the defendant were unsuccessful in his defense he would not be
estopped in a subsequent in personam suit by the quasi in rem judgment rendered against
him in the Seider action. The court added the proviso that the plaintiff in a Seider action
must be a New York resident. The latter requirement was reiterated in Farrell v. Piedmont
Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 840 (1969).
113 75 Misc. 2d 72, 247 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1973).
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of jurisdiction of the court over said persons, such obligations, or
this policy.'1 4
The defendants moved to vacate the order of attachment, arguing
that the above provision prevented any res from coming into existence.
The court denied the motion, quoting from the Seider opinion wherein
it was observed that "the policy [an automobile liability policy without
the clause at issue in Seligman] casts on the insurer several obligations
which accrue as soon as the insurer gets notice of an accident, and
whether or not suit is brought."" 5 These pre-existing obligations, the
Seligman court held, constitute an attachable res, despite the contractual limitation on the obligation to defend and indemnify.
The court's holding immediately raises certain practical questions.
Is the value of the res still the full measure of the policy limits despite
the reservation clause, or is it merely the value of the miscellaneous
package of rights which accrue before suit commencement, such as
the right to receive certain medical payments or to have the insurer
investigate the accident? If the latter is the rule, the plaintiff can look
forward to only a meager recovery. In Simpson v. Loehmann,"6° the
Court of Appeals held that "[fror the purpose of pending litigation,
which looks to an ultimate judgment and recovery, such value [of the
attached res] is [the policy's] face amount and not some abstract or
hypothetical value.""17 The policy in Simpson, however, did not contain the clause at issue in Seligman. Unfortunately, the Seligman court
refused to address the question, stating that the "rights, duties and obligations under the policy here are between [the insurer] and the defendants. It is not for this court to decide those matters in this proceeding." ' s The court did, however, strongly suggest that the clause might
be given no effect and the insurer held liable for the full policy limits.
Referring to the fact that the insurance form had been administratively
approved in New York, the court declared that "[t]he administrative
act of the Superintendent of Insurance, in approving the form of an
insurance contract, cannot be presumed to defeat the public policy of
the State of New York, or overcome the law as settled by the Courts of
New York."" 9
If it was the court's intent that the policy provision be vitiated
114 Id. at 73, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
115 Id. at 74, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 242, quoting Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 113, 216 N.E.2d
312, 314, 269 N.Y.S,2d 99, 101 (1966).
11621 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1968).
117 Id. at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
118 75 Misc. 2d at 74, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 242.

119 Id. at 74, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
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completely, its treatment of the issue seems too perfunctory. By overriding an agreement in a contract negotiated and delivered in another
jurisdiction and involving only nonresidents, a state may exceed the
bounds of due process. The question of a state's power in this sphere
was considered by the United States Supreme Court in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Company.120 There the validity of a Louisiana direct action statute was at issue. The plaintiff was a Louisiana
resident, injured in Louisiana by a product manufactured in another state. The Louisiana court allowed a direct action against the
manufacturer's liability insurer although the insurance contract, which
had been negotiated and delivered outside Louisiana, contained a provision prohibiting -such actions. The Supreme Court allowed the
Louisiana court to override the policy provision, placing great emphasis
on the state's interest in providing a forum for the redress of injuries
occurring within its own borders. The Court conceded that "[s]ome
contracts made locally, affecting nothing but local affairs, may well
justify a denial to other states of power to alter those contracts.''
It has been argued that in Watson the forum state's interest in the
case was much stronger than in Seider.2 2 In the former case, the injury
occurred within the forum state, a fact which in certain circumstances
may even provide a basis for in personam jurisdiction. 23 In the latter
case, the only jurisdictional nexus was the plaintiff's residence in the
forum state. Thus in the Seider situation the forum's interest may not
be strong enough to justify its rewriting a contract between nonresidents.
An earlier United States Supreme Court case, Home Insurance
Co. v. Dick, 24 placed a clear limitation on a state's power to disregard
provisions in out-of-state contracts. A Mexican resident insured commenced a quasi-in-rem action against a Mexican insurer in a Texas
court by garnishing reinsurers present there. The policy sued upon was
negotiated, executed, and was to be performed in Mexico, and contained a contractual statute of limitations on claims. Although this
limitations period had elapsed, the Texas court allowed the insured to
proceed, applying the Texas limitations period to the action. The
United States Supreme Court held that "Texas was. . . without power
848 U.S. 66 (1954), rehearingdenied, 848 U.S. 921 (1955).
121 Id. at 71.
122 MinichieHo v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 1968) (Anderson, J., dissenting),
aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844, rehearing denied, 396 U.S.
949 (1969).
123 See, e.g., CPLR 802(a)(3).
124 281 U.S. 897 (1930).
120
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to affect the terms of contracts so made. Its attempt to impose a greater
obligation than that agreed upon and to seize property in payment
of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty against deprivation of
property without due process of law.' u2 5 The analogy to the Seligman
case is quite clear. If the Seligman court's intent was to ignore the
provision absolving the insurer from liability in Seider-type cases, the
effect would be to impose a greater obligation than the insurer had
agreed to assume. Home Insurance requires the state to show some
interest in the case before it can do this.
As the Seligman case demonstrates, the Seider doctrine has a
boundless propensity for creating new problems.

26

To ameliorate this

situation, a recent legislative proposal would replace Seider with a
direct action statute. 12 7 A right of action would be created against

automobile liability insurers doing business or qualified to do business
in New York. The action would be maintainable against the insurer
regardless of any contrary provision in the policy but only in cases
involving out-of-state automobile accidents where no basis of personal
jurisdiction over the insured is present. The proposed statute would bar
all attachment of liability policies. While an action under this statute
might involve the voiding of provisions in out-of-state contracts, its
limitation to automobile cases makes it less objectionable than the
Seider doctrine which could conceivably have a wider application. More
importantly, the direct action statute would avoid the quasi-in-rem
nature of the proceeding, 128 thus eliminating the troublesome question
of determining the value of the attached res. Hopefully, this proposal
will soon become the law.
CPLR 5240: Court indicates that relief from a completed sale of real
property will be difficult to obtain.
Too often the sale of a judgment debtor's home pursuant to CPLR
5236 results in a miscarriage of justice. 1 29 In many cases, a substantial
125 Id. at 408.

126 Seider's difficulties have inspired much critical comment. See, e.g., La Brum, The
Fruits of Babcock and Seider: Injustice, Uncertainty and Forum Shopping, 54 A.BA.J. 747,
751 (1968); Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many Or Putting Seider Back Into Its
Bottle, 71 CoLum. L. REv. 660, 687 (1971); Stein, Jurisdiction By Attachment of Liability
Insurance, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 1075 (1968); 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, supp. commentary
at 14-72 (1973).
127 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORE, REPORT TO ThE 1973 LEGISLATURE
IN

FELATION TO THE CIVIL PRACriCE LAW AND RULES, PROPOSALS RELATING TO A RiIGHT OF

204650 (1973). This proposal was passed by the 1973 Legislature but was vetoed by the Governor.
128 Professor David D. Siegel notes that most of the problems of the Seider doctrine
arise from its quasi in rem mold. 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, supp. commentary at 51-52
(1973).
129 In 1963, both the right of redemption and the requirement that personal property
DIRECT AcTION AGAINST LIABILITY INSURANCE CARRIERS, MCKINNEY'S N.Y. SESSION LAws

